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ABSTRACT
Linking Exposure to Political Content on Social Media with Political Polarization: The
Mediating Role of Anger
Audrey Anne Halversen
School of Communications, BYU
Master of Arts
Previous research has detailed concerns that exposure to both pro- and counter- attitudinal
content on social media can result in outcomes of ideological polarization (e.g. Bail et al., 2018;
Lu & Lee, 2018). However, further research is needed in order to understand the conditions
under which this polarization may take place. To investigate this issue, this study utilizes a
sample of 414 social media users in the U.S. to investigate the mediating effects of a) anger
toward political opposites and b) anger toward oppositional social media content on the
relationships between various types of political content exposure and the outcome of ideological
polarization. Results revealed that both types of politically oriented anger partially or fully
mediated all relationships between the explanatory variables and the outcome variable,
demonstrating that exposure to all types of political content on social media can affect
polarization through the mechanism of anger. Theoretical implications for the echo chamber
theory and the backfire effect are discussed.

Keywords: social media, political content, polarization, anger, backfire effect, echo chamber
theory
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Introduction
Political polarization is on the rise in America (MCarty et al., 2016). Democrats and
Republicans are becoming increasingly divided in their ideological views (Pew Research Center,
2014), and large shares of Americans view members of their rival party as “immoral” and “closeminded” (Pew Research Center, 2019). In the midst of this polarized political climate, many
have expressed concern over the ways in which media consumption—especially digital media
consumption—may encourage polarization. Some have argued that online echo chambers or
filter bubbles create feedback loops of pro-attitudinal content that reinforce pre-existing views
(Pariser, 2011). Others have argued that, even when media consumers are exposed to counterattitudinal content, this content can trigger a backfire effect which similarly causes individuals to
become more convinced of their original positions (Bail et al., 2018; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010).
Claims of both the echo chamber theory and the backfire effect have met with significant
challenges over the past few years (Bruns et al., 2014; Dubois & Blank, 2018; Wood & Porter,
2019), suggesting there is still much to learn about the conditions under which exposure to both
pro- and counter-attitudinal political content may encourage political polarization. This is
especially true in the context of social media, where users are typically exposed to a variety of
ideological views (Beam et al., 2018; Nelson & Webster, 2017).
One factor that may play an important role in the relationship between exposure to
political content and political polarization is anger. Previous research has found that exposure to
political content can elicit anger (Hasell & Weeks, 2016; Lee & Kwak, 2014). Further, anger has
been linked to various forms of political polarization (Webster, 2018; Weeks, 2015). Social
media appears to be especially conducive to expressions of anger, especially where politics are
involved (Fan et al., 2014; Fan et al., 2016; Roberts et al., 2012), suggesting that the role of
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anger in facilitating polarization outcomes may be especially pronounced on these platforms.
Therefore, this study will investigate anger as a mediator of the relationship between exposure to
political content and polarization. Specifically, this study will investigate the mediating effects of
a) anger toward political opposites and b) anger toward oppositional social media content on the
relationship between various forms of exposure to political content on social media and the
outcome of ideological polarization.

3
Literature Review
Exposure to Pro-Attitudinal Political Media
Concerns about media consumers’ exposure to mainly pro-attitudinal political content
have origins in mid-20th century academic conversations. Festinger (1957), for example, argued
under cognitive dissonance theory that once people have determined their beliefs and attitudes,
they are motivated to maintain those beliefs. Extending this idea to the realm of media
engagement, Klapper (1960) later argued that audiences tend to expose themselves primarily to
mass media that confirm their beliefs and values. In the decades that followed, a variety of
scholars investigated topics related to audience inclinations toward selective exposure, including
moderators of selective exposure (Su, 1971; Schwartz et al., 1980), information utility (Brock et
al., 1970; Canon, 1964), and individual factors that influence selective exposure (Frey et al.,
1986; Innes, 1978; Schultz, 1974). By the 1980s, two notable scholars had published reviews
confirming the existence of selective exposure effects (Cotton, 1985; Frey, 1986), and the topic
has since received continued academic interest (Smith et al., 2008).
Most recently, scholars have sought to understand the ways in which digital media create
opportunities for selective exposure. The rise of digital media has constructed a high-choice
media environment wherein consumers are afforded an increased ability to customize their
content exposure (Stroud, 2008). As a result, scholars have debated the hypothesis that
individuals leverage this affordance in order to selectively expose themselves to content that
confirms their pre-existing views (Stroud, 2008).
A number of studies have contended that audiences do, in fact, demonstrate a preference
for online content that supports their views. (Fischer et al., 2005; Stroud, 2011). For example,
Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng (2009) found that, when presented equally with pro- and
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counter-attitudinal content on an online opinion forum, participants spent 36% more time reading
pro-attitudinal content. Additionally, this and other studies have further found that users’
preference for pro-attitudinal content is further pronounced when prior attitudes and preferences
are strongly held (Brannon et al., 2007; Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng; 2009). In other words,
those who feel most certain about their beliefs are most likely to prefer attitudinally consistent
content.
Psychologists have explained this dynamic as “confirmation bias”—or, the “seeking or
interpreting of evidence in ways that are partial to existing beliefs, expectations, or a hypothesis
in hand” (Nickerson, 1998 in Spohr, 2007, p. 154). Supporting this theory in the digital age, there
is evidence to suggest that individuals’ political beliefs coincide with the online media they
choose to consume (Stroud, 2008) and that consumers of online news are more willing to rate
attitude-consistent outlets as credible sources, while remaining skeptical of attitude-challenging
sources (Messing & Westwood, 2012).
Also important to the modern understanding of the high-choice media environment and
its potential to encourage pro-attitudinal content consumption is an appraisal of the increasingly
complex variables that factor into audiences’ information environments. For instance, Dylko et
al. (2017) noted that technologies create customizability in two distinct ways. First, user-driven
customizability is afforded when technologies allow users to directly modify their information
exposure. In the context of social media, this could include a user choosing which pages or
profiles to follow. Second, system-driven customizability is afforded when technologies modify
the information environment without direct user involvement. On social media platforms, this is
what takes place when algorithms determine what content appears on a user’s feed. Whether
user-driven or systems-driven customizability is more conducive to pro-attitudinal selective
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exposure remains a topic of debate. Bakshy et al. (2015) found that individual choices limited
exposure to cross-cutting content more than algorithmic rankings. Conversely, Dylko et al.
(2017) found that system-driven customizability was more conducive to pro-attitudinal selective
exposure than user-driven customizability.
Both user-driven and system-driven customizability play into ongoing concerns about
echo chambers (Jamieson & Cappella, 2008) or filter bubbles (Pariser, 2011) in online
information environments. Dubois and Blank (2018, p. 729) defined an echo chambers as “a
metaphorical way to describe a situation where only certain ideas, information and beliefs are
shared,” while filter bubbles have been defined as a state of isolation from counter-attitudinal
views that is encouraged by the personalization affordances of online platforms (Pariser, 2011).
There is some evidence that supports the existence of online echo chambers and filter
bubbles. For instance, Holbert and Benoit (2009) found that consumption of content from a
media outlet with a political bias is correlated with content consumption from outlets with that
same political bias. This suggests that people who engage with one politically slanted outlet may
be likely to surround themselves with similarly affirming content, creating an attitudinally
confirming “bubble” of information. This idea was also supported by Himelboiem et al. (2013),
who used cluster analysis to identify subgroups of users responding to the U.S. President’s 2012
State of the Union Speech on Twitter. Their analysis showed a pattern of ideologically
fragmented interactions where hubs were largely composed of either conservative or liberal
opinion, suggesting that discussions on social media platforms can be somewhat ideologically
homogeneous.
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Pro-Attitudinal Political Media and Polarization
Although a range of other scholarship argues against the echo chamber theory (Bruns et
al., 2014; Dubois & Blank, 2018), the possible existence of online echo chambers has prompted
concern—both in the scholarly community and more widely throughout society—that exposure
to pro-attitudinal content is facilitating the rise of political polarization, including affective
polarization (i.e. the increasing tendency for citizens to negatively perceive the opposite party)
and ideological polarization (i.e. the divergence of citizen views to opposite ends of the liberalconservative spectrum).
Some evidence exists to suggest there may be some merit to these concerns. Exposure to
pro-attitudinal political messaging does appear to reinforce attitudes (Knobloch-Westerwick et
al., 2015; Westerwick, 2017), and a number of studies have identified a connection between proattitudinal media consumption and various forms of polarization. For example, using data from
both the United States and South Korea, Kim (2015) found an association between selective
exposure to political content and polarized attitudes toward political candidates. Similarly, Lu &
Lee (2018) identified a correlation between exposure to pro-party television and polarized views
of political candidates and parties. Using cross-sectional data, Stroud (2010) provided
compelling evidence that selective exposure to partisan media results in polarization over time.
Meanwhile, Tewksbury & Riles (2015) discovered that higher frequencies of exposure to online
news were associated with increased ideological differences between Republicans and
Democrats.
The body of scholarship described above promotes the idea that polarization may be
facilitated by selective exposure to partisan content online. However, scholars have also argued
that concerns of over-exposure to partisan content leading to polarization are overstated. Trilling
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et al. (2017), for instance, failed to find evidence that exposure to pro-attitudinal content
increases polarization. Meanwhile, Prior (2013) stated that—in part, due to measurement
problems—there has historically been a dearth of solid evidence linking partisan content
consumption to polarization. Therefore, further research is needed in order to understand the
conditions under which this relationship may occur.
Counter-Attitudinal Political Media in Online Environments
Further complicating the idea of online echo chambers is rising evidence suggesting that
exposure to pro-attitudinal content—rather than being encouraged by digital media—is
moderated in online environments (Masip et al., 2020) and in media environments generally. For
example, using a series of data collected from multiple surveys, Garrett et al. (2013) found that,
between 2004 and 2008, Americans who consumed content from pro-attitudinal political sources
were also more likely to consume content from counter-attitudinal sources. Further, their results
showed that this was true even for those who were most committed to their ideological beliefs,
though the relationship was not as strong for these consumers.
Similar findings have emerged in studies purely focused on online content consumption.
Knobloch-Westerwick & Kleinman (2012) found that those who frequently consume online
news are less likely to show a confirmation bias in their consumption habits. More recently,
Masip et al. (2020) confirmed a similar dynamic for social media users, finding that more active
social media users were more likely to be exposed to counter-attitudinal content than less
frequent users. In observations of online behavior, Nelson and Webster (2017) found that
Facebook users navigated to a variety of news sites from their Facebook feeds, and that “red”
and “blue” sites had ideologically diverse audiences. Similarly, Beam et al. (2018) found that use
of Facebook news encouraged both pro- and counter-attitudinal news exposure. These findings
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suggest that digital media, rather than creating echo chambers, may provide opportunities for
incidental—rather than selective—exposure to counter-attitudinal content that facilitates user
engagement with cross-cutting views. Of course, it is also possible that active social media users
leverage the customizability aspects of these platforms (Dylko et al., 2017) to intentionally
expose themselves to counter-attitudinal content, though this possibility has not been as
thoroughly explored as selective exposure to pro-attitudinal content.
Counter-Attitudinal Political Media and the Backfire Effect
While numerous studies have investigated the potential for pro-attitudinal content
exposure to encourage various forms of polarization, fewer studies have investigated the
potential for counter-attitudinal content exposure to do the same. However, this idea has been
promoted, to some degree, through the theory known as the “backfire effect” (Nyhan & Reifler,
2010). The backfire effect has been used to describe an individual’s entrenchment into
misinformation when exposed to content meant to correct that misinformation. In some cases,
this effect may occur because the individual has a personal stake in the matter or holds a belief
that conflicts with the corrective information (Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Nyhan & Reifler,
2010). In other cases, in what are termed “familiarity backfire effects,” the simple repetition of
the misinformation, though followed by correction, may result in a strengthening of the
misinformation (Ecker et al., 2020; Peter & Koch, 2015).
The backfire effect may be more broadly defined as an individual’s increased
commitment to a previously held belief or ideology when exposed to counter-attitudinal content
(Chen et al., 2019; Sethi & Rangaraju, 2018; Yang et al., 2020). This understanding of the
backfire effect is, in some ways, united with ideas of pro-attitudinal selective exposure and
confirmation bias, in that both can be understood under the umbrella of cognitive dissonance
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theory. In the case of pro-attitudinal selective exposure, individuals have a desire to avoid
cognitive dissonance, while in the case of the backfire effect, individuals try to decrease
dissonance by strengthening their commitment to a pre-existing belief or moving even further
from the position of the new information. This view is summed up by Dieter Frey, who said,
“when facing cognitive dissonance brought by attitude-challenging information, the consistency
of the cognitive system is maintained by either avoiding attitude-inconsistent information, or by
counter arguing attitude-inconsistent information in order to find flaws in it” (Frey, 1986 in
Spohr, 2017, p. 154).
The backfire effect also aligns to some degree with theories of “motivated reasoning” or
“biased assimilation,” which argue that “people engage in cognitive processes in order to
advance some goal other than the formation of accurate beliefs” (Suhay & Erisen, 2018, p. 794).
This idea has been substantiated by the extant literature, which shows that individuals tend to
perceive counter-attitudinal information as lower quality and are more likely to generate
counterarguments when faced with this information (e.g. Lodge & Taber, 2013; Munro et al.,
2002; Redlawsk et al., 2010). However, the backfire effect goes beyond these theories by
purporting that audiences not only resist attitudinally challenging information but retreat further
toward their existing beliefs when confronted with this information.
Previous research has provided compelling evidence that this backfire effect occurs.
Nyhan and Reifler (2010), the inventors of the theory, found that when conservatives were
presented with information about weapons of mass destruction in Iraq that conflicted with their
attitudes, they subsequently became more convinced of their original views. This finding has
been replicated for a variety of other political issues, including healthcare reform (Nyhan et al.,
2013), the 9/11 terrorist attacks (Prasad et al., 2009) and climate change (Hart & Nisbet, 2012).
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Evidence for the backfire effect has also been found in social media environments. For
example, Bail et al. (2018) paid Democrats and Republicans to follow bots that retweeted
messages by elected officials and opinion leaders with opposing political views. Their results
revealed that Republicans expressed far more conservative attitudes after following a liberal
Twitter bot, while Democrats expressed slightly more liberal attitudes after following a
conservative Twitter bot. In other words, a backfire effect occurred when these users were
exposed to counter-attitudinal content in their online social network. Further supporting the
potential for a backfire effect to occur online, Lee et al. (2014) found that individuals who
participate in online political discussions more often and have more ideologically diverse social
media feeds are more likely to hold polarized opinions about party and ideology.
In spite of the above evidence, it should also be noted that some scholars have failed to
find evidence of the backfire effect. Wood and Porter (2019), for example, found no
informational corrections to pre-existing beliefs that were capable of triggering a backfire effect
among a subject pool of over 10,000 and across five different studies. These findings suggest
that people are generally amenable to fact-checking information, even when it conflicts with
their existing attitudes. However, because the study used verified information to correct factually
misinformed beliefs, the results of this study may not extend to instances of exposure to counterattitudinal content that is more opinion-based.
While evidence exists to suggest that exposure to both pro- and counter-attitudinal
content can result in outcomes of polarization (Bail et al., 2018; Kim, 2015; Lu & Lee, 2018;
Stroud, 2010; Tewsbury & Riles, 2015), there is also evidence against these claims (Prior, 2013;
Trilling et al., 2017; Wood & Porter, 2019) compelling enough to warrant caution in predicting
these relationships. Therefore, we posit the following four research questions. Because of the
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variety of ways in which content exposure is shaped on social media, we differentiate between
selective exposure (i.e. exposure that occurs when users intentionally seek out content) and
incidental exposure (i.e. content that the users happen to come across without intentionally
seeking it out) to both pro- and counter-attitudinal content.
RQ1: Will incidental exposure to pro-attitudinal political content on social media be
positively associated with ideological polarization?
RQ2: Will selective exposure to pro-attitudinal political content on social media be
positively associated with ideological polarization?
RQ3: Will incidental exposure to counter-attitudinal political content be positively
associated with ideological polarization?
RQ4: Will selective exposure to counter-attitudinal political content be positively
associated with ideological polarization?
Because current research regarding both a) the potential for exposure to pro-attitudinal
political content to reinforce views and create polarization (the echo chamber effect) and b) the
prevalence of backfire effects in response to counter-attitudinal political content exposure is
varied, there is a need to understand the conditions under which both of these theories are viable.
More specifically, there is a need to understand the conditions under which exposure to both proand counter-attitudinal social media content results in polarization.
One variable which has been explored in the context of political media consumption and
polarization is anger. Previous work has indicated that exposure to political content can elicit
anger (Hasell & Weeks, 2016; Lee & Kwak, 2014). Further, other scholars have connected anger
to outcomes of polarization (Webster, 2018; Weeks, 2015). Therefore, this study will investigate
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politically oriented anger as a mediator between various forms of content exposure and political
polarization.
Political Media Exposure and Anger
Previous scholars have argued that anger is central to everyday political activity and news
consumption (Ost, 2004; Wagner & Boczkowski, 2019). In fact, the mere act of prompting
individuals to think about politics has been shown to be a sufficient means of provoking a
reaction of anger (Webster, 2018). While anger is typically experienced as a short-lived mental
state (Nabi, 1999), anger has also been identified as a powerful motivator of political
participation and information seeking (Valentino et al., 2011; Weber, 2013), suggesting that the
cumulative effects of politically oriented anger can impact behavior change. For example, anger
has been linked to individuals’ willingness to engage in political action (Leach et al., 2006) and
participate in protest movements (Jasper, 2014). Therefore, it is important to understand how
political anger affects individuals’ attitudes and behaviors.
There is significant evidence to suggest that politically oriented anger may arise as a
result of political content exposure. Lee and Kwak (2014) found that exposure to political satire
about a public issue elicited negative emotions—specifically, anger and worry—in viewers.
Similarly, Hasell and Weeks (2016) found that those who consumed partisan news prior to the
2012 United States presidential election experienced anger toward opposing candidates. Adding
to this work, Chen et al. (2017) found not only that anger was related to satirical political content
exposure, but that participants were more likely to experience anger when exposed to counterattitudinal satire. Gervais (2017) uncovered a similar dynamic, finding that exposure to uncivil
political statements that targeted one’s in-group elicited anger in participants, while exposure to
pro-attitudinal uncivil statements did not.
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With this body of research in mind, it seems likely that exposure to counter-attitudinal
political content is associated with anger toward political opposites. However, despite some
evidence to the contrary (Gervais, 2017), it may also be possible that exposure to pro-attitudinal
political content—especially on social media—is associated with anger toward political
opposites. Because anger appears to be relatively widespread and contagious on social networks
(Fan et al., 2014; Fan et al., 2016; Roberts et al., 2012), and because angry sentiment appears to
be especially salient in political content on social platforms (Roberts et al., 2012), there is reason
to believe that exposure to political content on social media may be especially likely to trigger
anger and other negative emotions, whether pro- or counter-attitudinal in nature. This hypothesis
has already been partially supported by Wagner and Boczkowski (2019), who interviewed
individuals about their news consumption experiences and found that participants experienced
more intense negative emotions—including anger and anxiety—when consuming news through
social media, rather than through traditional outlets. Further, many pro-attitudinal political posts
on social media may reference users’ political opposites by calling out the actions of politicians
or others with whom the poster and user disagree, thus bringing “the other” to the user’s mind
and prompting a response of anger.
Anger and Political Polarization
Where there is reason to believe that exposure to political content fuels anger, there is
also reason to believe that anger fuels partisanship and polarization (Webster, 2018; Weeks,
2015). Anger has been shown to cause partisans to become more polarized in their views on
certain issues, including affirmative action (Banks & Valentino, 2012) and health care (Banks,
2014). After recalling a number of studies (e.g. MacKuen et al., 2010; Valentino et al., 2008)
which suggest that anger causes citizens to rely more heavily on preexisting partisan viewpoints,
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Gervais (2017, p. 387) notes that “accordingly, anger should motivate more partisan behavior,
including expressions of disdain toward the out-group.”
Some extant research appears to confirm Gervais’ conclusion. Previous studies have
connected anger toward political opponents with endorsement of aggressive policies toward
those opposing groups (Halperin & Gross, 2010; Lemer et al., 2003; Skitka et al., 2006). It has
also been argued that anger can increase social polarization between Democrats and Republicans
(Webster et al., 2020).
One of the most direct associations between anger and polarized outcomes was found by
Huber et al. (2015), who discovered that anger increased partisan attitudes and caused
individuals on both sides of the political aisle to perceive higher levels of polarization between
the two parties. They concluded that anger may fuel partisanship, which may in turn fuel anger,
creating a cycle of polarization that damages democratic functioning and cooperation. This
dynamic, as well as the resulting negative impacts on democracy, have been similarly warned
against by other scholars (Webster et al., 2020).
Anger and Biased Assimilation
One of the ways in which anger may influence the relationship between exposure to
political content and partisanship is through its impact on biased assimilation (Suhay & Erisen,
2018). Biased assimilation may be defined as “the tendency of individuals to adopt other
opinions if they are similar to their own” (Chen et al., 2019, p. 1). Suhay and Erisen (2018) argue
that anger motivates people to engage in biased assimilation of political information. Their
research showed that participants exposed to counter-attitudinal arguments experienced a number
of negative emotions, and, importantly, that those who experienced anger in reaction to these
arguments were also more likely to demonstrate a biased reaction to the content.
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Similar to this finding, Weeks et al. (2015) found that participants experiencing anger
were more likely to believe misinformation that aligned with their views and reject information
that conflicted with their views. Meanwhile, Knobloch-Westerwick et al. (2020) found that
participants experiencing a more negative affective state were more likely to demonstrate
confirmation bias. In the study most similar to ours, Lu and Lee (2018) identified anger and fear
as mediators of the relationship between exposure to pro-party television sources and affective
polarization among partisans. However, scholars have yet to investigate whether anger mediates
effects of political content exposure on ideological polarization, and this model has not been
researched in the context of social media.
In light of the above studies, including those that highlight the relationship between
exposure to political content and anger (Hasell & Weeks, 2016; Lee & Kwak, 2014) and those
that note a relationship between anger and various forms of political polarization (Webster, 2018;
Weeks, 2015), it is possible that politically-oriented anger is an important factor in the
relationship between political content exposure and polarization. In order to explore this
possibility, we will investigate both anger toward political opposites (including opposing party,
oppositional party leaders, and citizens of an oppositional party) and anger toward oppositional
social media content (including reactions of anger toward oppositional social media posts,
content posted by opposing politicians, and online conversation with political opposites).
Therefore, we propose the following hypotheses:
H1: Anger toward political opposites will mediate the relationship between incidental
exposure to pro-attitudinal political content on social media and ideological polarization.
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H2: Anger toward oppositional social media content will mediate the relationship
between incidental exposure to pro-attitudinal political content on social media and
ideological polarization.
H3: Anger toward political opposites will mediate the relationship between selective
exposure to pro-attitudinal political content on social media and ideological polarization.
H4: Anger toward oppositional social media content will mediate the relationship
between selective exposure to pro-attitudinal political content on social media and
ideological polarization.
H5: Anger toward political opposites will mediate the relationship between incidental
exposure to counter-attitudinal political content on social media and ideological
polarization.
H6: Anger toward oppositional social media content will mediate the relationship
between incidental exposure to counter-attitudinal political content on social media and
ideological polarization.
H7: Anger toward political opposites will mediate the relationship between selective
exposure to counter-attitudinal political content on social media and ideological
polarization.
H8: Anger toward oppositional social media content will mediate the relationship
between selective exposure to counter-attitudinal political content on social media and
ideological polarization.

17
Method
In order to investigate the research questions and hypotheses, a survey was conducted
online. The sample for this survey was collected through Amazon Mechanical Turk. Participants
were eligible to participate in this study as long as they were over the age of 18 and had an active
social media profile on at least one platform. All participants were required to read and agree to a
consent form detailing the procedures, risks, and terms of the study. Prior to conducting this
study, all designs and procedures were approved by the Institutional Review Board.
In order to compensate for documented validity issues with this platform (Peer et al.,
2014), two attention checks were included in the survey, and participants who failed to
accurately respond to both attention check questions were removed from the sample. This
strategy has been shown to improve the quality of data collected through Amazon Mechanical
Turk (Aust et al., 2013; Buhrmester et al., 2011). Initially, 428 individuals participated in the
survey. To ensure data quality, nine participants were removed from the sample for failing to
pass one or both of the two attention checks and five participants were removed from the sample
for completing the survey in an unusually short period of time (less than 2 minutes). A sample
size of 414 participants remained. Each participant was paid $1.00 for their participation in this
study.
Participants
Participants were asked to respond to a range of demographic questions, including age,
gender, race, ethnicity, and education level. Participants were also asked to report the political
party (if any) with which they identify and to describe their level of activity on social media
(including frequency of use and average hours per day spent on social media).
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Participants were between the ages of 18 and 64 (M = 38.9, SD = 10.6), and selfidentified as female (44.9%), male (53.1%), and non-binary (0.7%). A few respondents (1.2%)
indicated that they preferred not to disclose their gender. Participants were asked to indicate their
race and were allowed to select multiple boxes. A variety of races were represented in the
sample, including White (78.7%), Black or African American (10.6%), Asian (8.7%), American
Indian or Alaska Native (1.4%), Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander (0.2%) and other (1.9%).
Participants were also asked to indicate if they were of Hispanic, Spanish, or Latino ethnicity. A
number of participants indicated that they belonged to at least one of these ethnic groups (7.5%),
while the remainder indicated that they did not (92.3%).
The education levels of participants were as follows: less than high school degree (0.7%),
high school graduate (9.9%), some college but no degree (15.2%), associate degree in college
(10.1%), bachelor’s degree in college (44.9%), master’s degree (14.3%), doctoral degree (1.7%),
and professional degree (JD, MD) (2.9%). Participants identified their party affiliation as
Republican (23.7%), Democrat (50.0%), Independent (23.4%), and other (1.7%). A few
participants (1.2%) indicated no party preference. On the composite scale assessing social and
fiscal ideology, 138 participants scored on the conservative side of the scale (33.3%), 210
participants scored on the liberal side of the scale (50.6%), and 66 participants indicated
ideological neutrality (15.9%). See Table 1 for full sample characteristics.
Measures
Explanatory Variables
The following explanatory variables were used to assess various types of exposure to
political content on social media. These measures were adopted from Weeks et al.’s (2017)
measures of pro-attitudinal selective exposure and counter-attitudinal incidental exposure and
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were expanded to include pro-attitudinal incidental exposure and counter-attitudinal selective
exposure.
Pro-attitudinal incidental exposure. The degree to which participants were incidentally
exposed to pro-attitudinal political content on social media was measured using the following
items: “Sometimes people see political opinions or news on their social media feeds that they did
not seek out. In the past month, how often have you encountered the following types of content
on your social media feeds without having to actively search them out? 1) content that was
positive toward a politician you support 2) content that was critical of a politician you oppose 3)
content that supported your political views.” Participants responded to items on a six-point scale
(1 = “none” 2 = “about once” 3 = “2-3 times” 4 = “once a week” 5 = “a few times a week”
6 = “every day”), and items were averaged. Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was 0.87, M = 4.16,
SD = 1.37.
Pro-attitudinal selective exposure. The following items were used to measure the
degree to which participants sought out pro-attitudinal political content on social media:
“Sometimes people intentionally search for certain political opinions or news on social media. In
the past month, how often have you intentionally searched for content on social media that… 1)
was positive toward a politician you support 2) was critical of a politician you oppose 3)
supported your political views.” Participants responded to these items on a six-point scale
(1 = “none” 2 = “about once” 3 = “2-3 times” 4 = “once a week” 5 = “a few times a week”
6 = “every day”), and items were averaged. Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .093, M = 3.09,
SD = 1.72.
Counter-attitudinal incidental exposure. The degree to which participants were
incidentally exposed to counter-attitudinal political content on social media was measured using
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the following items: “Sometimes people accidentally come across political opinions or news on
social media that they did not seek out or expect to see. In the past month, how often have you
accidentally encountered content on social media that… 1) was critical of a politician you
support 2) was favorable toward a politician you oppose 3) disagreed with your political views ”
Participants responded to items on a six-point scale (1 = “none” 2 = “about once” 3 = “2-3 times”
4 = “once a week” 5 = “a few times a week” 6 = “every day”), and items were averaged.
Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was 0.90, M = 4.02, SD = 1.44.
Counter-attitudinal selective exposure. The following items were used to measure the
degree to which participants sought out counter-attitudinal political content on social media:
“Sometimes people intentionally search for certain political opinions or news on social media. In
the past month, how often have you intentionally searched for content on social media that… 1)
was critical of a candidate you support 2) was favorable toward a candidate you oppose 3)
disagreed with your political views. ” Participants responded to items on a six-point scale
(1 = “none” 2 = “about once” 3 = “2-3 times” 4 = “once a week” 5 = “a few times a week”
6 = “every day”), and items were averaged. Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .092, M = 2.38,
SD = 1.48.
Mediating Variables
Following Webster’s (2018) finding that merely asking participants to think about
politics can elicit anger, participants were prompted to investigate their emotional state while
thinking about a variety of political groups, individuals, interactions, and content. These items
were divided into two primary mediating variables.
Anger toward political opposites. The extent to which participants feel anger toward
their political opposites was assessed using three items. The first item assessed anger toward an
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opposing political party: “When I think about the major political party (Republican, Democratic,
etc.) I most disagree with, I feel…” The second item assessed anger toward politicians from an
opposing political party: “When I think about prominent politicians I disagree with, I feel…”
The third item assessed anger toward members of an opposing political party: “When I imagine
conversing about politics with someone who identifies with the major political party (Republican
or Democratic) I most disagree with, I feel…” For each of these three items, participants were
asked to use a 10-point slider scale ranging from “not angry at all” to “extremely angry” to rate
the degree to which they experienced anger in reaction to the item. The three items were
averaged to create one scale measure of anger toward political opposites. Cronbach’s alpha for
this scale was 0.89, M = 5.27, SD = 2.53.
Anger toward oppositional social media content. The extent to which participants feel
anger when confronted with oppositional social media content was measured using three items.
The first item assessed the degree to which participants experience anger in reaction to counterattitudinal political posts on social media: “When you see political opinions you disagree with on
social media, how do you tend to feel?” The second item assessed the degree to which
participants experience anger in reaction to political posts from oppositional politicians on social
media: “When you see posts from politicians you disagree with on social media, how do you
tend to feel?” The third item assessed the degree to which participants experience anger when
conversing with those whom they disagree with politically on social media: “When you discuss
(or imagine discussing) political issues with people you disagree with on social media, how do
you tend to feel?” For each of these three items, participants were asked to use a 10-point slider
scale ranging from “not angry at all” to “extremely angry” to rate their anger. Items were
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averaged to create one scale measure of anger toward oppositional social media content.
Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was 0.94, M = 4.82, SD = 2.43.
Outcome Variable
Ideological polarization. Ideological polarization was measured using two items. The
first items investigated participants’ social views by asking them to respond to the following
item: “I consider my views on social issues to be…” Participants responded to this prompt on a
nine-point Likert scale (1 = “extremely conservative” 2 = “very conservative” 3 = “conservative”
4 = “slightly conservative” 5 = “neither conservative nor liberal” 6 = “slightly liberal” 7 =
“liberal” 8 = “very liberal” 9 = extremely liberal”). The second item assessed participants’ fiscal
views by asking them to respond to the following item: “I consider my views on fiscal issues to
be…” Participants similarly responded to this item on a nine-point Likert scale from “extremely
conservative” to “extremely liberal.” In order to create the scale measure, these two items were
averaged. The Cronbach’s alpha for this scale was .90. Then, because we are interested in how
far to one side or the other a participant’s views lie, participants’ average scores on these two
items were re-coded in the following manner: 1 and 9 = 9, 1.5 and 8.5 = 8, 2 and 8 = 7, 2.5 and
7.5 = 6, 3 and 7 = 5, 3.5 and 6.5 = 4, 4 and 6 = 3, 4.5 and 5.5 = 2, 5 = 1. This resulted in a ninepoint scale measuring ideological polarization, M = 4.70, SD = 2.53. Using this method,
participants who indicated that they were extremely liberal or conservative rated high on the
scale, while those who indicated little or no ideological preference rated low on the scale.
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Results
The researchers used IBM SPSS software version 27 to perform statistical analyses. In
order to investigate the relationships between the variables, a bivariate correlation matrix was
generated (see Table 2). The results of this correlation matrix were used to assess RQ1 – RQ4.
RQ1 asked whether incidental exposure to pro-attitudinal political content on social
media would be positively associated with ideological polarization. A Pearson’s correlation
analysis was conducted to examine the relationship between these two variables. The analysis
showed a statistically significant positive relationship, r(411) = .25, p < .001. Therefore, RQ1
was answered in the affirmative.
RQ2 asked whether selective exposure to pro-attitudinal political content on social media
would be positively associated with ideological polarization. A Pearson’s correlation analysis
was conducted to examine the relationship between these two variables. The analysis showed a
statistically significant positive relationship, r(412) = .17, p < .001. Therefore, RQ2 was
answered in the affirmative.
RQ3 asked whether incidental exposure to counter-attitudinal political content would be
positively associated with ideological polarization. A Pearson’s correlation analysis was
conducted to examine the relationship between these two variables. The analysis showed a
statistically significant positive relationship, r(411) = .18, p < .001. Therefore, RQ3 was
answered in the affirmative.
RQ4 asked whether selective exposure to counter-attitudinal political content would be
positively associated with ideological polarization. A Pearson’s correlation analysis was
conducted to examine the relationship between these two variables. The analysis showed a nonsignificant relationship, r(409) = .06, p = .244. Therefore, RQ4 was answered in the negative.
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In order to address H1 – H8, eight hierarchical regression analyses were conducted using
Andrew Hayes’ PROCESS, an SPSS macro that tests for indirect effects. All tests were
conducted using Model 4, a simple mediation model in PROCESS. According to previous
recommendations, the analysis used 5000 bootstrap samples and 95% confidence intervals.
Heteroscedasticity-consistent inference was set to HC4 (Cribari-Neto), conditioning values were
set to 16th, 50th, and 84th percentiles, and no centering was used for construction of products. In
each of the mediation tests, a number of covariates were included in the model. These were age,
gender, education, and frequency of social media use. The results of the following mediation
tests are presented in Table 4.
To test H1 (i.e. anger toward political opposites will mediate the relationship between
incidental exposure to pro-attitudinal political content on social media and ideological
polarization) a simple mediation test was conducted. Incidental exposure to pro-attitudinal
content (x) predicted anger toward political opposites (m) along path A at a significant value, r =
.29, p < .001, b = .52, t(388) = 4.80, p < .001. Controlling for x, the mediator then affected
ideological polarization (y) along path B at a significant value, r = .38, p < .001, b = .25, t(388) =
4.80, p < .001. Finally, incidental exposure to pro-attitudinal content (x) predicted ideological
polarization (y) along path C’ at a significant value, r = .28, p < .001, b = .42, t(388) = 4.22, p <
.001. The results of this test showed that anger toward political opponents partially mediated the
relationship between incidental exposure to pro-attitudinal content and ideological polarization
(b = .13, 95% CI: .06 to .21). Therefore, H1 was supported (see Figure 1).
To test H2 (i.e. anger toward oppositional social media content will mediate the
relationship between incidental exposure to pro-attitudinal political content on social media and
ideological polarization) a simple mediation test was conducted. Incidental exposure to pro-
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attitudinal content (x) predicted anger toward oppositional social media content (m) along path A
at a significant value, r = .27, p < .001, b = .32, t(385) = 3.20, p = .002. Controlling for x, the
mediator then affected ideological polarization (y) along path B at a significant value, r = .34, p
< .001, b = .19, t(385) = 3.60, p < .001. Finally, incidental exposure to pro-attitudinal content (x)
predicted ideological polarization (y) along path C’ at a significant value, r = .30, p < .001, b =
.44, t(385) = 4.38, p < .001. The results of this test showed that anger toward oppositional social
media content partially mediated the relationship between incidental exposure to pro-attitudinal
content and ideological polarization (b = .06, 95% CI: .02 to .12). Therefore, H2 was supported
(see Figure 2).
To test H3 (i.e. anger toward political opposites will mediate the relationship between
selective exposure to pro-attitudinal political content on social media and ideological
polarization) a simple mediation test was conducted. Selective exposure to pro-attitudinal content
(x) predicted anger toward political opposites (m) along path A at a significant value, r = .31, p <
.001, b = .44, t(389) = 5.83, p < .001. Controlling for x, the mediator then affected ideological
polarization (y) along path B at a significant value, r = .36, p < .001, b = .27, t(389) = 5.04, p <
.001. Finally, selective exposure to pro-attitudinal content (x) predicted ideological polarization
(y) along path C’ at a significant value, r = .25, p < .001, b = .24, t(389) = 3.06, p = .002. The
results of this test showed that anger toward political opposites partially mediated the
relationship between selective exposure to pro-attitudinal content and ideological polarization (b
= .12, 95% CI: .06 to .19). Therefore, H3 was supported (see Figure 3).
To test H4 (i.e. anger toward oppositional social media content will mediate the
relationship between selective exposure to pro-attitudinal political content on social media and
ideological polarization) a simple mediation test was conducted. Selective exposure to pro-
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attitudinal content (x) predicted anger toward oppositional social media content (m) along path A
at a significant value, r = .31, p < .001, b = .36, t(386) = 4.70, p < .001. Controlling for x, the
mediator then affected ideological polarization (y) along path B at a significant value, r = .31, p
< .001, b = .20, t(386) = 3.67, p < .001. Finally, selective exposure to pro-attitudinal content (x)
predicted ideological polarization (y) along path C’ at a significant value, r = .25, p < .001, b =
.24, t(386) = 3.00, p < .001. The results of this test showed that anger toward oppositional social
media content partially mediated the relationship between selective exposure to pro-attitudinal
content and ideological polarization (b = .07, 95% CI: .03 to .13). Therefore, H4 was supported
(see Figure 4).
To test H5 (i.e. anger toward political opposites will mediate the relationship between
incidental exposure to counter-attitudinal political content on social media and ideological
polarization) a simple mediation test was conducted. Incidental exposure to counter-attitudinal
content (x) predicted anger toward political opposites (m) along path A at a significant value, r =
.25, p < .001, b = .36, t(387) = 3.58, p < .001. Controlling for x, the mediator then affected
ideological polarization (y) along path B at a significant value, r = .36, p < .001, b = .28, t(387) =
5.44, p < .001. Finally, incidental exposure to counter-attitudinal content (x) predicted
ideological polarization (y) along path C’ at a significant value, r = .24, p < .001, b = .26, t(387)
= 2.60, p = .01. The results of this test showed that anger toward political opposites partially
mediated the relationship between incidental exposure to counter-attitudinal content and
ideological polarization (b = .10, 95% CI: .04 to .18). Therefore, H5 was supported (see Figure
5).
To test H6 (i.e. anger toward oppositional social media content will mediate the
relationship between incidental exposure to counter-attitudinal political content on social media
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and ideological polarization) a simple mediation test was conducted. Incidental exposure to
counter-attitudinal content (x) predicted anger toward oppositional social media content (m)
along path A at a significant value, r = .31, p < .001, b = .38, t(384) = 4.03, p < .001. Controlling
for x, the mediator then affected ideological polarization (y) along path B at a significant value, r
= .31, p < .001, b = .20, t(384) = 3.86, p < .001. Finally, incidental exposure to counterattitudinal content (x) predicted ideological polarization (y) along path C’ at a significant value, r
= .325, p < .001, b = .27, t(384) = 2.74, p = .006. The results of this test showed that anger
toward oppositional social media content partially mediated the relationship between incidental
exposure to counter-attitudinal content and ideological polarization (b = .08, 95% CI: .03 to .14).
Therefore, H6 was supported (see Figure 6).
To test H7 (i.e. anger toward political opposites will mediate the relationship between
selective exposure to counter-attitudinal political content on social media and ideological
polarization) a simple mediation test was conducted. Selective exposure to counter-attitudinal
content (x) predicted anger toward political opposites (m) along path A at a significant value, r =
.21, p = .006, b = .30, t(387) = 3.40, p < .001. Controlling for x, the mediator then affected
ideological polarization (y) along path B at a significant value, r = .34, p < .001, b = .30, t(387) =
5.70, p < .001. Finally, selective exposure to counter-attitudinal content (x) predicted ideological
polarization (y) along path C’ at a significant value, r = .18, p = .031, b = .09, t(387) = 1.01, p =
.314. The results of this test showed that anger toward political opposites fully mediated the
relationship between selective exposure to counter-attitudinal content and ideological
polarization (b = .13, 95% CI: .06 to .21). Therefore, H7 was supported (see Figure 7).
To test H8 (i.e. anger toward oppositional social media content will mediate the
relationship between selective exposure to counter-attitudinal political content on social media
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and ideological polarization) a simple mediation test was conducted. Selective exposure to
counter-attitudinal content (x) predicted anger toward oppositional social media content (m)
along path A at a significant value, r = .25, p < .001, b = .23, t(384) = 2.67, p = 008. Controlling
for x, the mediator then affected ideological polarization (y) along path B at a significant value, r
= .28, p < .001, b = .22, t(384) = 4.18, p < .001. Finally, selective exposure to counter-attitudinal
content (x) predicted ideological polarization (y) along path C’ at a significant value, r = .18, p =
.031, b = .08, t(384) = .93, p = .353. The results of this test showed that anger toward
oppositional social media content partially mediated the relationship between selective exposure
to counter-attitudinal content and ideological polarization (b = .05, 95% CI: .01 to .10).
Therefore, H8 was supported (see Figure 8).
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Discussion
This study investigated the relationships between four types of political content exposure
on social media (pro-attitudinal incidental exposure, pro-attitudinal selective exposure, counterattitudinal incidental exposure, and counter-attitudinal selective exposure), the mediating
variables of a) anger toward political opposites and b) anger toward oppositional social media
content, and the outcome variable of ideological polarization. In order to address the main
implications of this paper, we will review the findings associated with each of the four
explanatory variables and discuss how these findings relate and add to existing research and
theory.
The first two explanatory variables were pro-attitudinal incidental exposure and proattitudinal selective exposure. Both variables were positively correlated with ideological
polarization. This finding gives some credence to concerns that repeated exposure to proattitudinal online political content may be partially responsible for polarization (Pariser, 2011).
Further, this finding suggests that both a) having a social media feed that frequently shows proattitudinal political content and b) using social media to intentionally seek out pro-attitudinal
views may encourage more polarized views. This supports the hypothesis of both the echo
chamber theory and the filter bubble (Pariser, 2011) that pro-attitudinal content exposure is
linked to polarization and supports a variety of other research which has demonstrated this
relationship (Kim, 2015; Lu & Lee, 2018; Stroud, 2010; Tewskbury & Riles, 2015). However, it
does not confirm the hypothesis of the echo chamber and filter bubble theories that the
underlying cause of polarization outcomes is that social media users have homogenous feeds.
First, our correlation matrix showed a strong relationship between incidental exposure to proattitudinal content and incidental exposure to counter-attitudinal content, suggesting that users
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who frequently see pro-attitudinal views on their feeds also often see counter-attitudinal views.
This supports the results of many other scholars who have discovered that users tend to have
heterogeneous feeds (Beam et al., 2018; Nelson & Webster, 2017) and adds to the litany of data
showing concerns of overly homogenous social media feeds may be overstated (Garrett et al.,
2013; Masip et al., 2010). Second, in addition to both forms of pro-attitudinal content exposure
being linked to polarization, our results showed that incidental counter-attitudinal exposure was
also linked to polarization, suggesting that the exposure to cross-cutting views that comes with a
more heterogenous social media feed may also be linked to polarization. This finding will be
discussed in further detail later. Finally, it should be noted that, due to the cross-sectional nature
of the data, it is possible that those who are more ideologically extreme enjoy consuming
affirming political content more than those who are more ideologically neutral. This would
support the work of previous work which has found that preferences for pro-attitudinal content
are especially pronounced when prior attitudes and preferences are strongly held (Brannon et al.,
2007; Knobloch-Westerwick & Meng; 2009).
It is also important to note that the positive correlation between pro-attitudinal incidental
exposure and ideological polarization was stronger than the correlation between pro-attitudinal
selective exposure and the outcome variable. This suggests that intentionally seeking out proattitudinal content on social media may have less of an impact on polarization than having a
social media feed where pro-attitudinal content frequently appears. This may be because users
tend to consume more political content through incidental means than selective means, making
the incidental effects of social media use stronger. This possibility should be explored in future
research.
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Anger toward political opposites and anger toward oppositional social media content
partially mediated the relationships between both incidental and selective exposure to proattitudinal content and ideological polarization. Further, for both of these explanatory variables,
anger toward political opposites had a stronger indirect effect on the outcome that anger toward
oppositional social media content. These results support findings linking online political content
exposure to anger (Hasell & Weeks, 2016; Lee & Kwak, 2014) and linking anger to polarization
outcomes (Gervais, 2017; Huber et al., 2015; Webster, 2018; Weeks, 2015). Further, the results
emphasize that even exposure to online political content a user agrees with may affect politically
oriented anger, contradicting some previous evidence (Gervais, 2017). Due to the high degree of
angry sentiment in online spaces (Fan et al., 2014; Fan et al., 2016;) and in online political posts,
specifically (Roberts et al., 2012; Wagner & Boczkowski, 2019), it seems likely that many proattitudinal posts exhibit some level of anger, perhaps by referencing “the other” or criticizing
views espoused by the other side. Our findings suggest that, as a result of frequent exposure to
these pro-attitudinal posts, users may tend to respond more angrily to oppositional political posts
and—to perhaps an even greater degree—develop stronger feelings of anger toward their
political opposites. These findings have direct implications for the echo chamber and filter
bubble theories. Specifically, we propose that when users experience an echo chamber effect
online, this effect takes place partially through the induction of politically oriented anger. Users
may be exposed to pro-attitudinal content which affects feelings of anger toward both
oppositional content and political opposites; this anger, in turn, may affect the ideological
leanings of users as they desire to retreat from the views of those toward whom they hold
feelings of anger. Therefore, future research involving the effects of pro-attitudinal exposure on
social media users should take the role of anger into account.
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The other two explanatory variables investigated in this study were counter-attitudinal
incidental exposure and counter-attitudinal selective exposure. While counter-attitudinal
incidental exposure was positively correlated with ideological polarization, counter-attitudinal
selective exposure was not significantly correlated with the outcome variable. This first
finding—that counter-attitudinal incidental exposure predicts polarization to some degree—is
interesting in that it contradicts the echo chamber theory concept that it is predominately online
homophily which creates polarization. The finding also provides some support for the existence
of online backfire effects (Lewandowsky et al., 2012; Nyhan & Reifler, 2010). Similar to the
findings of Lee et al. (2014) and Bail et al. (2018), who found that exposure to cross-cutting
views on social media can actually increase ideological polarization, our results show that being
incidentally exposed to counter-attitudinal views online does not create more neutral beliefs in
users, but rather may create increased polarization. The answer for why this relationship occurs
may be partially found in the mediation results for this relationship, which showed that both
anger toward political opposites and anger toward oppositional social media content partially
mediated the relationship between incidental counter-attitudinal exposure and polarization. This
result indicates that exposure to cross-cutting views online—which may often be angry or critical
in tone (Roberts et al., 2012)—may prompt higher levels of political anger in users, which in turn
creates ideological polarization, thus explaining one mechanism by which the backfire effect
occurs.
Also important to ongoing conceptions of the backfire effect is the result that counterattitudinal selective exposure was not significantly linked to the outcome of polarization. This
indicates that, when users actively seek out contradicting opinions on social media, a backfire
effect may be less likely to occur. It may be that, by selectively choosing what cross-cutting
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content to expose themselves to, users are able to choose more moderate, less inflamed counterattitudinal views. Conversely, it may also be that those who seek out political opinions from
political opponents have a genuine interest in the politics of the opposing side and thus are more
likely to hold more neutral ideological views, while those who are more ideologically extreme
may have less desire to engage with oppositional content. More research should be conducted to
determine why this relationship may not materialize; however, what this finding does indicate is
that it is possible to engage in cross-cutting content on social media in a way that does not result
in ideological polarization. This finding supports previous research which has expressed
skepticism of the backfire effect (Wood & Porter, 2019) or indicated that exposure to counterattitudinal content can cause social media users to change their opinions on a political issue
(Duggan & Smith, 2016).
The mediation results for counter-attitudinal selective exposure add some nuance to the
above finding and shed light on the conditions under which backfire effects occur. Results
showed that both anger toward political opposites and anger toward oppositional social media
content fully mediated the relationship between counter-attitudinal selective exposure and
polarization. This shows that, while many users selectively expose themselves to counterattitudinal content without experiencing a backfire effect, those who have high levels of
politically oriented anger may experience this effect. This finding may be explained through the
concept of biased assimilation (Suhay & Erisen, 2018). Previous work has shown that people are
more likely to engage in biased assimilation when they have high levels of anger (Suhay &
Erisen, 2018, Knobloch-Westerwick et al, 2020; Weeks et al., 2015). Therefore, it may be that
when those with high levels of political anger—and especially anger toward political opposites—
seek out opposing views on social media, seeing these views only serves to elicit anger, prompt
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biased assimilation of the content, and result in ideological polarization. This sort of process may
occur when, for example, a social media user seeks out the posts of a politician they dislike,
digests the content in a biased manner, and experiences anger toward the politician and the views
they espouse. Over time, this may result in increased anger toward political opposites generally
and may cause users to wish to retreat further from the views of those with whom they disagree.
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Conclusion
The findings of this study generally confirm the importance of anger in political activity
and content consumption (Ost, 2004; Wagner & Boczkowski, 2019). Most importantly, this
study suggests that, whether they are incidentally or selectively exposed to pro- or counterattitudinal political content, social media users who are heavily exposed to this content may
develop more polarized views if they develop stronger feelings of politically oriented anger as a
result of this content exposure. This suggests that the polarization outcomes hypothesized by
both the echo chamber theory and the backfire effect can be realized under the condition of
political anger.
The findings of this study suggest that future researchers should continue to investigate
the role that anger plays in experiences with political content on social media. Due to the crosssectional nature of the data, the causal claims made in this paper, though based in theory, cannot
be fully supported. Therefore, future research should also investigate the potential for pro- and
counter- attitudinal political content to elicit politically oriented anger and in turn affect
polarization using experimental methods. The results of this study should be considered in light
of a few limitations. In addition to being limited by its cross-sectional data, this study is also
limited by the typical limitations of online survey research (LeFever et al., 2007) and of the
Amazon Mechanical Turk platform (Aust et al., 2013; Buhrmester et al., 2011). Further, it is
possible that individuals who are more interested in politics may have been more likely to
respond to the survey. Finally, this study rests on the assumption that the mere act of prompting
individuals to think about politics can elicit feelings of anger (Webster, 2018).
The findings of this research are of interest to users of social media, media educators, and
to the social media companies whose algorithms determine feeds. Users of social media should
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be aware of the emotional effects of both pro- and counter- attitudinal political content on social
media and should be advised to examine their emotional reactions—especially negative
reactions—to this content. It may be helpful for media literacy campaigns, in addition to teaching
students how to recognize reliable and unreliable information, to teach media consumers to
check their emotional responses to online political content and ponder the causes of those
reactions. Causes may stem from legitimate policy concerns or may from the emotional language
employed in political posts (Roberts et al., 2012), rather than their substance. Social media
companies, some of whom are considering providing further customization options that allow
users to view less political content (Roos & Isaac, 2021), should also be aware that both pro- and
counter-attitudinal content may result in politically oriented anger and polarization and take this
into account in their decision making.
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Appendix A—Tables
Table 1
Sample characteristics
Demographic
Age
Race
White
Black or African American
American Indian or Alaska Native
Asian
Native Hawaiian or Pacific Islander
Other

M = 38.9 (SD = 10.6)
326 (78.7%)
44 (10.6%)
6 (1.4%)
36 (8.7%)
1 (0.2%)
8 (1.9%)

Ethnicity
Spanish, Hispanic, or Latino
None of the above

31 (7.5%)
382 (92.3%)

Gender
Male
Female
Non-binary
Prefer not to say

220 (53.1%)
186 (44.9%)
3 (0.7%)
5 (1.2%)

Education
Less than high school degree

3 (0.7%)

High school graduate (high school diploma or
equivalent including GED)

41 (9.9%)

Some college but no degree
Associate degree in college (2-year)
Bachelor's degree in college (4-year)
Master's degree
Doctoral degree
Professional degree (JD, MD)
Party Affiliation
Republican
Democrat
Independent

63 (15.2%)
42 (10.1%)
186 (44.9%)
59 (14.3%)
7 (1.7%)
12 (2.9%)

98 (23.7%)
207 (50.0%)
97 (23.4%)
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Other
No preference

7 (1.7%)
5 (1.2%)

Frequency of Social Media Use
Monthly
A few times a month
Weekly
A few times a week
Daily
Several times a day

9 (2.2%)
7 (1.7%)
15 (3.6%)
38 (9.2%)
133 (32.1%)
212 (51.2%)

Daily Hours on Social Media
Less than 30 minutes
30 minutes – 1 hour
1-2 hours
2-3 hours
3-4 hours
4+ hours

79 (19.1%)
143 (34.5%)
93 (22.5%)
58 (14%)
17 (4.1%)
24 (5.8%)

Note: Participants were able to select more than one race

Table 2
Bivariate correlation matrix
1

2

3

4

1

IEPC

2

IECC

.54**

3

SEPC

.33**

.21**

4

SECC

.22**

.29**

.67**

5
6
7

AOC
APO
Ideological polarization

.23**

.27**

.24**

.13*

.27**
.25**

.23**
.18**

.27**
.17**

.16**
.06

**Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level
*Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level
IEPC: Incidental exposure to pro-attitudinal content
IECC: Incidental exposure to counter-attitudinal content
SEPC: Selective exposure to pro-attitudinal content
SECC: Selective exposure to pro-attitudinal content
AOC: Anger toward oppositional content on social media
APO: Anger toward political opposites

5

6

.75**
.22**

.29**

7
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Table 3
Means and standard deviations
IEPC
IECC
SEPC
SECC
AOC
APO
Ideological Polarization

M
4.16
4.02
3.09
2.38
5.27
4.82
4.7

SD
1.37
1.44
1.72
1.48
2.53
2.43
2.53

Table 4
Indirect effects of explanatory variables on ideological polarization via mediators

Mediation Path

Indirect effect Indirect effect
95% C.I.
Bootstrap
Estimate (b)
LL
UL

Pro-attitudinal incidental exposure  anger toward political
opposites  ideological polarization

0.13

0.06

0.21

Pro-attitudinal incidental exposure  anger toward
oppositional social media content  ideological polarization

0.06

0.02

0.12

Pro-attitudinal incidental exposure  anger toward political
opposites  ideological polarization

0.12

0.6

0.19

Pro-attitudinal incidental exposure  anger toward
oppositional social media content  ideological polarization

0.07

0.03

0.13

Pro-attitudinal incidental exposure  anger toward political
opposites  ideological polarization

0.1

0.04

0.18

Pro-attitudinal incidental exposure  anger toward
oppositional social media content  ideological polarization

0.08

0.03

0.14

Pro-attitudinal incidental exposure  anger toward political
opposites  ideological polarization

0.13

0.06

0.21

Pro-attitudinal incidental exposure  anger toward
oppositional social media content  ideological polarization

0.05

0.01

0.1
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Appendix B—Figures
Figure 1
Anger toward political opposites mediates the relationship between pro-attitudinal incidental
exposure and ideological polarization.

**p < .001

*p < .01

Figure 2
Anger toward oppositional social media content mediates the relationship between proattitudinal incidental exposure and ideological polarization.

**p < .001

*p < .01
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Figure 3
Anger toward political opposites mediates the relationship between pro-attitudinal selective
exposure and ideological polarization.

**p < .001

*p < .01

Figure 4
Anger toward oppositional social media content mediates the relationship between proattitudinal selective exposure and ideological polarization.

**p < .001

*p < .01
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Figure 5
Anger toward political opposites mediates the relationship between counter-attitudinal
incidental exposure and ideological polarization.

**p < .001

*p < .01

Figure 6
Anger toward oppositional social media content mediates the relationship between counterattitudinal incidental exposure and ideological polarization.

**p < .001

*p < .01
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Figure 7
Anger toward political opposites mediates the relationship between counter-attitudinal selective
exposure and ideological polarization.

**p < .001

*p < .01

Figure 8
Anger toward oppositional social media content mediates the relationship between counterattitudinal selective exposure and ideological polarization.

**p < .001

*p < .01
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Appendix C—Survey
1. Do you currently have an account on at least one social media platform (e.g. Facebook,
Instagram, Twitter, etc.) that you access at least once a month?
o Yes
o No
[If no, survey ends]
2. Sometimes people intentionally search for certain political opinions or news on social
media. In the past month, how often have you intentionally searched for content on
social media that...
a) was positive toward a candidate you support
• Not at all, about once, 2-3 times, once a week, a few times a week, every day
b) was critical of a candidate you oppose
• Not at all, about once, 2-3 times, once a week, a few times a week, every day
c) supported your political views
• Not at all, about once, 2-3 times, once a week, a few times a week, every day
3. In the past month, how often have you intentionally searched for content on social
media that…
a) was critical of a candidate you support
• Not at all, about once, 2-3 times, once a week, a few times a week, every day
b) was favorable toward a candidate you oppose
• Not at all, about once, 2-3 times, once a week, a few times a week, every day
c) disagreed with your political views
• Not at all, about once, 2-3 times, once a week, a few times a week, every day
4. Sometimes people come across political opinions or news on social media that they did
not intentionally seek out. In the past month, how often have you unintentionally
encountered content on social media that…
a) was positive toward a candidate you support
• Not at all, about once, 2-3 times, once a week, a few times a week, every day
b) was critical of a candidate you oppose
• Not at all, about once, 2-3 times, once a week, a few times a week, every day
c) supported your political views
• Not at all, about once, 2-3 times, once a week, a few times a week, every day
5. In the past month, how often have you unintentionally encountered content on social
media that…
a) was critical of a candidate you support
• Not at all, about once, 2-3 times, once a week, a few times a week, every day
b) was favorable toward a candidate you oppose
• Not at all, about once, 2-3 times, once a week, a few times a week, every day
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c) disagreed with your political views
• Not at all, about once, 2-3 times, once a week, a few times a week, every day
The following questions will ask you to think about how you typically feel when you see
political content that you disagree with on social media.
6. When I encounter political opinions I disagree with on social media, I tend to feel…
• 10-point slider scale: “Not angry at all” to “extremely angry”
7. When I see posts from U.S. politicians I typically disagree with on social media, I tend to
feel…
• 10-point slider scale: “Not angry at all” to “extremely angry”
8. When I discuss political issues with people I disagree with on social media, I tend to
feel…
• 10-point slider scale: “Not angry at all” to “extremely angry”
The following questions will ask you to think about how you feel when you think about
certain groups or situations.
9. When I think about the major political party (Republican or Democrat) I most disagree
with, I feel…
• 10-point slider scale: “Not angry at all” to “extremely angry”
10. When I think about prominent U.S. politicians I typically disagree with, I feel…
• 10-point slider scale: “Not angry at all” to “extremely angry”
11. When I imagine conversing about politics with someone who identifies with the major
political party (Republican or Democrat) I most disagree with, I feel…
• 10-point slider scale: “Not angry at all” to “extremely angry”
12. When I think about the mainstream media, I feel…
• 10-point slider scale: “Not angry at all” to “extremely angry”
13. How often do you use social media?
• Monthly
• A few times a month
• Weekly
• A few times a week
• Daily
• Several times a day
14. How many hours per day do you typically spend on social media?
• Less than 30 minutes
• 30 minutes - 1 hour
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•
•
•

1-2 hours
2-3 hours
3+ hours

15. What is your gender?
• Male
• Female
• Gender Variant/Non-Conforming
• Not Listed
______________________ (write in)
• Prefer Not to Answer
16. How old are you?
[Drop down menu]
17. Please specify your race (select all that apply)
• White
• Black or African American
• American Indian or Alaska Native
• Asian Indian
• Japanese
• Native Hawaiian
• Guamanian or Chamorro
• Filipino
• Vietnamese
• Samoan
• Other Asian
• Other Pacific Islander
• Some Other Race
______________________ (write in)
18. Are you of Hispanic, Latinx, or Spanish origin?
• No, not of Hispanic, Latinx, or Spanish origin
• Yes, Mexican, Mexican American, Chicano
• Yes, Puerto Rican
• Yes, Cuban
• Yes, another Hispanic, Latinx, or Spanish origin (for example, Argentinean,
Colombian, Dominican, Nicaraguan, Salvadorian, etc.)
19. What is the highest level of school you have completed or the highest degree you have
received?
• Less than high school degree
• High school graduate (high school diploma or equivalent including GED)
• Some college but no degree
• Associate degree in college (2-year)
• Bachelor’s degree in college (4-year)
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Master’s degree
Doctoral degree
Professional degree (JD, MD)

The questions below ask you to assess where you would place yourself on an ideological
scale from extremely conservative to extremely liberal.
20. I consider my views on social issues to be…
• Extremely conservative
• Very conservative
• Conservative
• Slightly conservative
• Neither conservative nor liberal
• Slightly liberal
• Liberal
• Very liberal
• Extremely liberal
21. I consider my views on fiscal issues to be…
• Extremely conservative
• Very conservative
• Conservative
• Slightly conservative
• Neither conservative nor liberal
• Slightly liberal
• Liberal
• Very liberal
• Extremely liberal
22. Generally speaking, do you usually think of yourself as a Republican, a Democrat, an
Independent, or something else?
• Republican
• Democrat
• Independent
• Other
________________________ (write in)
• No preference
23. How important to you is your party identity (Republican, Democrat, etc.)?
• Not at all important, somewhat important, important, very important, extremely
important
24. How important to you is your ideological identity (conservative, liberal, etc.)?
• Not at all important, somewhat important, important, very important, extremely
important

